Many practical issues in medical ethics depend on an understanding of the concept of health. The main question is whether it is a purely descriptive or a partly evaluative or normative concept. After posing some puzzles about the concept, the views of C Boorse, who thinks it is descriptive, are discussed and difficulties are found for them. An evaluative treatment is then suggested, and used to shed light on some problems about mental illness and to compare and contrast it with (...) physical illness and with political and other deviancies which are not illnesses. (shrink)

ARISTOTLE'S PROGRAM Aristotle says outright that the law of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated: you can't prove everything, and among the things you ...

The philosophical papers comprising this volume range from process metaphysics and theology, through the phenomenological study of intentionality, to the foundations of geometry and of the system of real numbers. New light, it is thought, is shed on all these topics, some of them being of the highest interest and under intensive investigation in contemporary philosophical discussion. Metaphysi cians, process theologians, semanticists, theorists of knowledge, phenomenologists, and philosophers of mathematics will thus find in this book, it is hoped, helpful materials (...) and methods. The categoreal scheme of Whitehead's Process and Reality is discussed rather fully from a logical point of view in the first paper [I] in the light of the author's previous work on the logico-metaphysical theory of events. The clarification that results is thought to provide a new depth and precision to the problem of interpreting one of the most difficult books in the recent history of metaphysics and cosmol ogy. A detailed examination of some aspects of Hartshorne's recent Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method is given in II. This book is perhaps the most significant work on process philosophy since Process and Reality itself, and its logical underpinnings thus merit a full critical discussion. (shrink)

In attempting to date the Shield several complementary methods are possible. Roughly these may be classed as literary, historical and archaeological. The literary method indicates that the Shield comes late in the Hesiodic corpus: in particular the use of the F is careful. The historical method suggests a preciser upper limit. Wilamowitz believed that the point of lines 393–401, which give the season in which the combat between Herakles and Kyknos took place, can only be that a commemorative festival was (...) held—at the temple of Apollo at Pagasae, since the scene is laid in Apollo's sanctuary. Mazon continues that the reputation of the temple dates from the end of the Sacred War and the establishment at Pherae of a dynasty with close connections with Delphi : he therefore sets the terminus post quern at about 590. This argument is attractive and possible. Several scholars have attempted to secure a lower limit from the last sentence in Hypothesis A: κα⋯ Στησ⋯χορος δ⋯ φησιν ' Hσ7iota;⋯δου εἶναι τ⋯ πο⋯ημα. But as Wilamowitz observes, we do not know whether the poem in which this mention came was a genuine work of Stesichoros. Certainly it need not make the Shield much earlier than the Stesichorean poem, since our ‘Hesiod’ wrote his epyllion for incorporation in the Ehoiai which was attributed to the genuine Hesiod, and an insertion into such a work could have been very quickly accepted. Mazon's lower limit of 560 is then on insecure grounds. Thirdly there is the possibility that analysis of the decoration of Herakles' shield might give useful comparisons to the conclusions of archaeologists on the chronology of Greek art. It is this method that I shall attempt. (shrink)

In an earlier article a reconstruction was proposed of the stemma of the primary manuscripts of Livy. If such a stemma has been correctly drawn up, it must work, that is, it must enable an editor to arrive by routine methods at the reading of the archetype. The archetype itself need not have good readings—it may have bad ones, emended by later manuscripts—but, good or bad, it gives the tradition from which all correction must start. If these readings make grammatical, (...) linguistic, and contextual sense and if there is no external tradition such as citations in grammarians or scholia, they may be taken to constitute what Livy wrote; if they do not make sense, then the editor must resort to correction on the basis of them. (shrink)

This book sets high standards for itself. Regrettably it fails to meet them: apart from a few displays of thorough and competent research, it is generally based on substandard scholarship.

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.